

SYMINGTON AMENDMENT TO THE DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL

Section 745. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not more than a total of \$4 billion of the funds appropriated by this Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency and for intelligence work performed by or on behalf of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

STATEMENT BY
SENATOR STUART SYMINGTON (D-MO)
SENATE FLOOR
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1971

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

INTELLIGENCE -- THE GREAT WASTE IN GOVERNMENT

A premise to these observations, and the amendment which I thereupon plan to offer to this military appropriation bill, is based on a belief that the Senate is as much interested in the question of the overall structure and functioning of our intelligence apparatus as is the House of Representatives.

One notes that earlier this month, in its report to the House, the House Committee on Appropriations made the following observations; and inasmuch as these observations confirm both our own thinking and our findings over recent years, I will read them into the Record at this point.

"The Committee feels that the intelligence operations of the Department of Defense have grown beyond the actual needs of the Department and are now receiving an inordinate share of the fiscal resources of the Department.

"Redundancy is the watchword in many intelligence operations. The same information is sought and obtained by various means and by various organizations.

"Coordination is less effective than it should be.

"Far more material is collected than is essential.

"Material is collected which cannot be evaluated in a reasonable length of time and is therefore wasted.

"New intelligence means have become available and have been incorporated into the program without offsetting reductions in old procedures."

As noted in this House report, their conclusions were based on extensive hearings. (Let us note also that last year this House Committee held extensive hearings on intelligence activities in the Department of Defense, the bulk of which proceedings were included in the public record.)

During these hearings, the then Assistant Secretary of Defense, now Secretary of the Army, Secretary Froehlke, who had been directed by the Secretary of Defense to review the intelligence programs, also testified that he "was surprised to find that there was no comprehensive inventory of DOD intelligence assets." He thereupon stated that he concurred with the Committee's expressed concern about duplication in the intelligence community.

In addition, this Report states that "the Committee expects to review the intelligence program in total during the hearings on the fiscal year 1973 budget request."

In reviewing the hearings and reports of interested Senate committees, we can find no comparable interest on their part with respect to the billions appropriated annually for intelligence.

Back in 1966, as a member of both the CIA Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I became concerned that, because of their lack of knowledge of certain intelligence matters bearing on foreign policy, members of the Foreign Relations Committee were not in a position to make intelligent judgment of certain United States policies overseas. Accordingly, I presented this situation as I saw it to the then Chairman of Armed Services, Senator Russell.

At the beginning of the 90th Congress, in January 1967, Chairman Russell invited three members of the Foreign Relations Committee to sit with the CIA Subcommittee of Armed Services, which committee also included members of the Senate Appropriations Committee. This arrangement presumably continues, but the members of the Foreign Relations Committee participate as a matter of grace, not of right. I say presumably because in any case the CIA Subcommittee has no right to meet with them from what I understand does not plan to meet.

During a markup last week of military appropriations by the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, no mention was made of the multi-billion dollar appropriation requests contained in this bill for most of the some fifteen intelligence operating or/and advisory groups in the Executive Branch of this government.

As an ex officio member of Appropriations because of being ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, after the Subcommittee meeting I called the staff of Appropriations to ask in general about the intelligence appropriations; but was told that, except for the five senior members of the Senate Appropriations Committee, they had been instructed not to talk about these multi-billion dollar intelligence appropriations, even to the other members of the Appropriations Committee.

This means that these billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money are being authorized and appropriated by the Senate with the knowledge and approval of just five of its members.

As a result of their three-year investigation -- 1969-1971 -- of our worldwide treaties and commitments, both staff teams of the Senate Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Foreign Relations Committee found heavy duplication, therefore waste of the taxpayers' money, in the intelligence field; and perhaps even more important, they found many conditions which were not known by those on the Senate Committees designated to review our military and political policies and position with other countries.

The cover story in a recent issue of Newsweek magazine confirms this confusion and waste; and details general dissatisfaction with much of it. The article states that President Nixon's 'major complaints are faulty intelligence, runaway budgets and a disparity between a glut of facts and a poverty of analysis.'

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This article also asserts, "bureaucracy has transformed what began as an amateurish happy few into a sprawling intelligence conglomerate encompassing more than a dozen government agencies, 200,000 employees and a budget of some \$6 billion a year."

As one member of the Senate, despite my committee assignments, I do not know whether those figures are accurate or inaccurate, too large or too small.

Earlier this month, the news media began calling me one evening about a major reorganization in the intelligence field that had just been announced by this government. I told them the truth -- that I knew nothing about it.

The press carried a story about this reorganization the next morning. I thereupon called the CIA to find out about it and later that day -- Saturday -- a member of that organization delivered the White House press release to my home, stating that press release was all the Agency knew about it at the time.

It is clear to anyone familiar with the Executive Branch that this reorganization (1) could be turning over the intelligence operation to the military -- exactly what the National Defense Act of 1947 took careful steps to prevent -- and (2) places policy control of intelligence in a new committee in the White House, headed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Mr. Kissinger (on this committee sit both the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense.)

This gives Executive Privilege to the final policy makers, and therefore, except for the power of the purse, enables said policy makers to, in effect, take the entire question of intelligence out of the hands of the Congress.

I thereupon made a short talk on the floor of the Senate delineating this extraordinary development, and protesting that such a major change incident to our overall security should not be made without the knowledge let alone the approval, of anybody in the Senate; and ask that this talk be inserted at the end of these remarks.

The Chairman of the newly formed White House Intelligence Committee, Dr. Kissinger, thereupon called me and said I was right, that the change should have been discussed with the proper committees of the Congress, that the reorganization details had been handled by Mr. George Shultz, and that he, Kissinger, would arrange for Mr. Shultz to come down and talk to me about it.

I thanked him for his call, but said I felt any such a briefing should be given to the committees, not to an individual member. That is the last I have heard of it.

In a recent article in the U. S. News & World Report, written by the former Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director of the CIA, a very serious charge was made, namely, that the present setup gives "the military considerable power to shape intelligence estimates." The article went on:

"Whenever you're working on a problem that the military is deeply interested in -- because it's affecting one of their programs, or their war in Vietnam, or something -- and you're not saying what they want you to say, the browbeating starts: the delaying tactics, the pressure to get the report to read more like they want it to read, in other words, influencing intelligence for the benefit of their own operation or activity."

A former member of the CIA establishment, in a reply to these statements published in the same issue of that magazine, stated: "In both the Senate and the House there are subcommittees of both Appropriations and Armed Services. In the Senate, members of the Foreign Relations Committee are invited to join briefings of the other subcommittees;" and then states, "I submit that there is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive closer scrutiny and 'control' than the CIA."

Based on the facts presented above, the reverse of that statement is true and it is shameful for the American people to be so misled. There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA; and the same is true of other intelligence agencies of the government, who reportedly receive billions of dollars more each year than does the CIA.

I have the greatest respect for the five members of the Senate Appropriations Committee who alone of all Senators know the details of this multi-billion dollar authorization and appropriation; but I do not believe that they, and they alone, should render final decision on both said authorizations and appropriations without the knowledge, let alone the approval, of any other Senators, including those on the Armed Services Committee who are not on this five member subcommittee of Appropriations, and all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The latter committees have fully as much interest in our military and political activities in foreign lands as do members of this Appropriations Subcommittee; in fact, the heads of the CIA in foreign countries operate under the supervision of the Ambassador; and those Ambassadors report to the Secretary of State.

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Today we all know this nation faces serious fiscal and monetary problems. Our economy is in grave trouble and one of the chief reasons for this condition has to do with our vast military expenditures at home and abroad.

With that premise, apprehension about this situation can only be increased by the fact the reorganization announced earlier this month by the White House in turn increases the influence of the military in the formulation of intelligence estimates. I was a Secretary in the Defense Department when the National Security Act of 1947 was passed -- in fact monitored the passage of that bill for Secretary Patterson -- and therefore know this is exactly what President Truman and his advisors, for the obvious reasons, attempted to avoid. (The wording of the law itself makes the point and I ask that this wording be inserted at the end of these remarks.)

If this analysis is correct, many billions of additional and often unnecessary dollars will be added to the defense budget, because that budget is based on intelligence estimates of the plans, programs and production of the possible enemy; and invariably the estimates of the military have been higher than those of the civilians.

Knowledge -- intelligence -- about the plans and programs of the possible enemy is generally considered to be at least as important as any other factor in the formulation of the Defense Budget.

As but one example of that importance, there follows a colloquy between the distinguished present Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and former Secretary of Defense McNamara, during the Defense Appropriations hearings of 1967:

Senator Ellender: "What part does the State Department take in making decisions that have resulted in the programs you are presenting to us now?"

Secretary McNamara: "That State Department is informed of, but does not affect my recommendations as to what ought to be done."

Senator Ellender: "Are your recommendations founded solely on what you get from the JCS?"

Secretary McNamara: "No, sir, they are not. The JCS are, of course, the principal military advisers to the President by law, and of much more importance they are actually his military advisers because of their experience. But the national intelligence estimates are taken into account in my recommendations as well as other information."

Again, in that this year the CIA Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee has not met once, it would appear there is now even more secrecy in the handling of intelligence funds; and this at a time when there is a steadily rising chorus among the people of this country for less secrecy.

Apparently some people believe that the very word "intelligence," in itself, requires that all these billions should only be authorized and appropriated in such great secrecy.

To me this is sheer nonsense. We authorize and appropriate, through the proper Congressional committees, tens of billions of dollars annually for the other component parts of the military.

There is nothing secret, for example, about the constantly referred to cost of a nuclear aircraft carrier, or the cost of the C-5A, or the cost of the Main Battle Tank; but knowledge of these costs does not mean that either the Congress or the American public have been informed, in case of a war, how, along with our military personnel, it is planned to utilize these weapons. That would be getting into war plans, something which should be studiously avoided.

By the same token, knowledge of the overall cost of intelligence does not in any way entail the release of knowledge about how the various intelligence groups function, or plan to function.

Why should there be greater danger to national security in making public overall intelligence costs than in making public other overall security costs?

I am certain in my own mind that we would not have engaged in at least one war -- killing people and having our own killed -- if pressures, combined with unwarranted secrecy, had not been characteristic of our intelligence knowledge and activities in that country; because our political and military actions were approved by the Congress on the basis of misinformation and a lack of information.

In summary, therefore, I do not believe the Senate can meet its responsibilities, or exercise its "constitutional prerogative" if this bill is approved under these circumstances; therefore I now offer an amendment which provides that the Senate impose a ceiling on the amount of funds in this bill that can be expended for intelligence activities during the fiscal year in question.

Responsible news media continue to assert to the American people that the cost of intelligence to the American taxpayer now runs to between \$5 and \$6 billion. I do not believe that figure is necessarily correct, but if it is correct, it but confirms the many informed reports we have had about duplication and waste.

I send my amendment to the desk and ask that it be read.

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REMARKS: The Director has asked that all members of the Executive Committee read the attached in full.		
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FORM NO. 241
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